A BSTRACT After surprise attacks and other intelligence failures, the complaint is often heard that if only decision-makers had listened more closely to the warnings they had received, disaster might have been avoided. But even though it is generally agreed that intelligence is of little use unless it is received and understood by policymakers, we actually know little about why some leaders are receptive toward intelligence, while others are not. This article argues that the willingness of decisionmakers to listen to intelligence depends primarily on two factors: their belief in the seriousness of the issue or threat involved, and their trust in the utility of intelligence. It examines contrasting receptivity toward intelligence in the cases of Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway,a nd suggests that our current models of intelligence -policy relations need to be revised.
Introduction
Why won'tt hey listen? This complaint is often heard from intelligence officials and commentators after amajor intelligence failure. The intelligence community had warned -t hey had produced memos and briefings, or even delivered urgent warnings in person -a nd yet their work appears to have fallen on deaf ears.
her he needed to see her immediately with an update on the Al Qaeda threat. Such am eeting was extremely unusual; Tenet writes: 'I can recall no other time in my seven years as DCI that Is ought such an urgent meeting at the White House'. 2 Tenet and several other officials went to the White House on 10 July 2001, and aC entral Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst began the briefing for Rice by exclaiming: 'There will be asignificant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!' 3 Yetdespite this urgent warning, Rice did not apparently feel the information was significant enough to take action on, or even to remember when asked about it later. 4 More recently,a lthough an umber of domestic terrorist plots have been thwarted, warnings about potential terrorist attacks appear to have been disregarded in several prominent cases including the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and the 2009 Christmas Day airplane bombing attempt. 5 And although the intelligence community has come under fire for having failed to anticipate the turmoil of the 'Arab spring', we have also seen complaints that the Obama administration should have listened to warnings that had been made about potential unrest in Egypt -w arnings not from the intelligence community,but from agroup of academics and policy analysts who had been writing for some time about ac oming crisis in that country. 6 For many intelligence officials and other observers, the answer to this puzzle about intelligence receptivity is simple: policymakers tend to listen to intelligence that supports their policies or preconceptions, and to dismiss warnings and assessments that run counter to their beliefs. The editor of one prominent journal, for example, recently complained that intelligence is typically ignored 'by politicians with their own particular agendas into which they have invested considerable political and economic capital '. 7 This article argues that thequestionofwhy policymakers do or do notlisten to intelligence dependsl esso nl eaders'p redispositions than on twoc ritical factors: theirbeliefinthe seriousnessofthe issueorthreatinvolved, andtheir trustinthe utilityofthe intelligence they receive. If leadersdonot take thethreat or problemseriously,and they do nottrust theintelligencetheyare given, they areu nlikelyt ot akea ctione veni nt he face of thes tarkesto fw arningsf rom intelligence.I na ddition, policymakerr eceptivity is largelyi nfluenced by the levelofprecision of theintelligenceprovided: although leaderstendtoask for ands ay they want big-picture, strategici ntelligence, they actually arem uch more likely to actonthe basisofspecific,tactical-level warnings.
To make this argument andtoattempt to identifythe factorsthatcan produce policymakerr eceptivity,t hisa rticle examines twoc ases in whichd ecisionmakers faceds imilar situations ands imilar warnings from intelligence,a nd yetr eacted very differently. Thesec ases mayb et he best knownc ontrasting caseso fp olicymakerr eceptivity in theh istory of American intelligence:t he failureo fw arning andr eceptivityb eforeP earl Harbor,f ollowedb yt he successful useofintelligenceonlysix months lateratthe BattleofMidway.
The importance of policymaker receptivity has been widely noted; Ohad Leslau recently commented that: 'Only when decision makers are receptive can the intelligence product enjoy great influence '. 8 But what do we mean by receptivity,a nd how do we measure it? Id efine receptivity -t he dependent variable of this study -a s the willingness and readiness to act on the warnings from intelligence.
Ia mn ot attempting to make an ormative argument aboutw hether or not policymakers should be receptive. It is certainlynot my intentiontoargue that leadersa nd decision-makerss houldi na ll cases' listen'toi ntelligence-if by listen we mean that they should automaticallya ct upon thea ssessments produced by theirintelligencestaffs. In some cases, afterall,intelligencemight be wrong,and theresultofpolicymaker receptivitycould be thefailure of policy or even disaster.MarkLowenthal haspointed outthatinsomecases military leadersd ow ellb y failing to paya ttention to intelligence (thati s, by being unreceptive).Aneffective leader,Lowenthal writes,may be onewho 'can take decisive action in thefaceofincomplete, minimal, or even vastly discomforting intelligence '. 9 Theq uestiono fw hether andw henp olicymakerss houldb e receptiveiswellbeyondthe scopeofthisarticle,which insteadfocuses on the question of what factorstendtomakethose leadersmoreorlessreceptive.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The next section very briefly reviews the literature on policymaker receptivity.F ollowing that, Ia ddress the question of whether it is worthwhile to compare the uses of intelligence in the two cases of Pearl Harbor and Midway; several prominent scholars have argued that these cases are so dissimilar that there can be few valuable lessons gained from such acomparison, and Idescribe my counter to this argument. The two major sections are close examinations of the intelligence warnings available, and decision-makerreceptivity toward those warnings, in the cases of Pearl Harbor and Midway.Ihave chosen to go into some detail because even though these cases are well known, Ia rgue there are still lessons to be learned from examining them. The article concludes by reviewing those lessons, both for the study of intelligence theory and for policy today.
Existing Thinking on Intelligence Receptivity
The question of when and why policymakers listen to intelligence is an important aspect of intelligence-policy relations.
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Stephen Marrin has described what he calls the 'standard model' of the intersection between intelligence analysis and decision-making. According to this conventional view,intelligence provides informationtodecision-makers that is factual and objective, and then decision-makers use that information to help inform their decisions -w ithout attempting to influence the intelligence assessments they receive.
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Under this model, policymakers treat intelligence officials like independent and objective experts, and they decide whether to heed that intelligence based on their own objective analysis of the facts and the situation.
ButM arrinwritest hatt here is no evidence that this standard modelreally works; instead, undera na lternativem odel,d ecision-makers tend to resist intelligence that conflictswiththeir pre-setbeliefs.
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Robert Jervis describesthis alternativemodel as holdingtrueinmanycases,arguing that once policymakers make up theirm inds aboutacourse of action,t heya re unlikely to listent o contrary intelligence.
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Accordingt oJ ervis, if decision-makers aret ob e receptivetowardintelligence,timingiscritical: 'For intelligence to be welcomed andtohaveanimpact, it must arrive at theright time,which is afterthe leaders have become seized with thep roblem butb eforet heyh avem adeu pt heir minds'. 14 Jervis also notesthat: 'Perhaps intelligence canhavemostinfluenceif it operates on questions that areimportant butnot immediatelypressing'.
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The question of receptivity is also similar to the question of whether,a nd when, does intelligence 'matter' in the making of foreign or other types of government policy. 16 The alternative model of intelligence-policy relations suggests that policymakers are simply not as interested in receiving 10 Joshua Rovner argues that although we would like to think that decision-makers will welcome all the insights from intelligence that they can get: 'In reality,wefind that policy makers are wary and even suspicious of intelligence '. 18 And in ar ecent book, Paul Pillar writes that intelligence plays little role in determining American foreign policy,l argely because the way decision-makers use intelligence bears 'almost no resemblance' to the ideal model in which they would carefully consider the facts and analysis from intelligence agencies before making policy. 19 Also useful for the question of receptivity are the literatures on learning in foreign policy and other organizations, 20 and on the so-called 'warningresponse gap' studied in the field of conflict prevention and elsewhere.
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But few comparative studies have been conducted to help us understand why policymakers do or do not listen to intelligence.
22
Marrin recommends that 'a new kind of theory be developed to explain how intelligence analysis is actually used by decision-makers'.
23
It is ag oal of this article to help spark development of such atheory.
Pearl Harbor and Midway: Apples and Oranges?
Although the military,strategic, and intelligence aspects of both Pearl Harbor and Midway continue to be studied and debated and books and articles on each are published every year,s urprisingly little work has been done by historians and intelligence scholars to compare the use of intelligence in the two events. This is largely because although both cases involve surprise attacks in the Pacific during World WarI I, they have been seen as very different situations that do not merit close comparison. 22 An important recent exception is Leslau, 'The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process'. My study differs from Leslau's, however,inthat Leslau treats policymaker receptivity as one of several variables to be considered in attempting to determine why and when intelligence will be influential in the decision-making process. My study treats receptivity as the dependent variable -Iam attempting to find out what factors or variables make aleader more or less receptive toward intelligence. 23 Marrin, 'Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making', p.131.
One of the few scholars to argue that it is worthwhile to compare the two cases is Ariel Levite, who holds that the differences between the cases are not as important as their similarities, notably that the same two countries are involved, in the same geographic region, and in roughly the same period of time. In fact, the similarities between the two cases are so great, he argues, as to create 'what functionally approximatesacontrolled experiment'. 24 Most scholars of surprise attack and intelligence, however,donot believe there is value in making such ac omparison. Richard Betts, for example, argues that comparing the two cases is like comparing 'peacetime apples' with 'wartime oranges'. 25 The stakes and risks involved in decisions about whether an enemy will go to war,Betts writes, are very different from those about where and when the enemy will strike during awar.
Despite these criticisms, Ibelieve the similarities between the two cases are indeed striking, supporting Levite'sp oint that they can serve as at ype of natural experiment. The same US intelligence system that failed to detect and warn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was successful, only six months later,i nd etecting and warning of af ollow-on attack on Midway.T he adversaries were the same, the geography was the same, and the intelligence organizations, sources, and methods were the same. Several key decisionmakers on the American side were different, 26 but it would be difficult, I believe, to find ab etter comparison to use in attempting to determine the factors that make the difference between receptive and unreceptive decisionmaking.
Pearl Harbor: AC ase of Unreceptive Decision-Making
Historians and other students of the Pearl Harbor disaster have pointed to a number of key pieces of intelligence and warning that were available before the attack, arguing that commanders at the time should have recognized the seriousness of these warnings and taken better precautions to prevent a Japanese assault -i ns hort, that they should have been more receptive. This section first reviews several of the most important of these warnings, and 26 The starkest contrast in leadership between the cases is the change of senior officials in Hawaii from Admiral Kimmel and General Short prior to 7December,toAdmiral Nimitz in the position of overall command prior to the Battle of Midway.Another difference in terms of the decision-makers involved is that Franklin Roosevelt and other senior officials in Washington were much less involved in the decision-making for Midway than they had been concerning American policy in the Pacific prior to Pearl Harbor. then examines the question of why they were not heeded by decision-makers in Hawaii or in Washington.
Many of these pieces of intelligence can be categorized as strategic warning, often derived from strategic-level communications systems that were processed and analyzed mostly in Washington. Several of these strategic warnings were plans and reports derived from war games and exercises conducted during the years before the attack. Beginning at least as early as 1936, war games in Hawaii had been planned on the basis of war with Japan (which was referred to as 'Orange'). In many scenarios the conflict began with aJ apanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor,a nd several documents written by senior American military officers during these years read today as eerily prescient.
27
Although these reports were not intelligence products, they were likely inspired by intelligence estimates of the situation and they have been frequently cited as crucial warnings missed in the period prior to the attack.
One such report was the 'Bloch memo', prepared by Rear Admiral Claude Bloch, commandant of the 14th Naval District, which included Hawaii. On 30 December 1940, Bloch sent amemo to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington,v ia AdmiralJ ames Richardson,w ho preceded Admiral Husband Kimmel as Commander of the US Fleet in Hawaii, on the subject of the security of the fleet. Bloch wrote: 'Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers '. 28 This memo received Admiral Richardson'se ndorsement,a nd inspired Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner,the navy'swar plans chief in Washington, to prepare aletter for US Navy Secretary Frank Knox'ssignature that Gordon Prange describes as 'one of the most historic Knox ever signed'. That letter -s ent to Hawaii in January 1941 after Kimmel had taken command -w arned that: 'If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by as urprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor'. Pearl Harbor-type scenario was imagined before the war,b ut not believed. In his memoirs, Ridgway writes that in 1939, when he was stationed in San Francisco, he put on acommand post exercise based on the assumption that the Pacific fleet had been neutralized or destroyed. But his scenario was loudly criticized, and he was told that such an assumption 'was a possibility so improbable it did not constitute aproper basic for amaneuver'. It appears that even he did not take such at hreat very seriously; he notes that later when Pearl Harbor was attacked, he was stationed at the US Army WarPlans Division in Washington, and he and the rest of the division 'were taken as much by surprise as were the officers and men of the ships that were attacked'; Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway,a sT old to Harold H. Martin (New York: Harper 1956) pp.46 -8. 28 Prange, Goldstein and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept,p .41. 29 Ibid., p.45.
As econd document, which has become known as the 'Martin-Bellinger Report', was as tudy by the army and navy air chiefs in Hawaii on military planning in the event of an attack. This report, dated 31 March 1941, stated that an Orange (meaning Japanese) attack force could arrive without warning from intelligence, and: 'It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles'.
30
Other strategic warnings appeared -a tl east after the fact -t oi ndicate that Japan was preparing for war against the United States. These included call signs changes: On 1N ovember and again on 1D ecember 1941, the Japanese changed their 20,000 radio call signs, making it much harder for US intelligence to read their message traffic. Then, partly because of the call sign changes and partly because the Japanese fleet engaged in radio silence while other elements of the Japanese Navy transmitted deceptive radio traffic, American analysts lost track of the Japanese aircraft carriers in midNovember,and disagreed on where they were likely to be located.
31
Just before the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese government sent several last-minute cables to its embassy in Washington, and these have also been considered crucial missed warning signals. These messages were sent from Tokyo on 6D ecember 1941; they were decrypted by an avy intercept station on Bainbridge Island near Seattle, and forwarded to Washington by teletype as they came in throughout the day on 6December and into the early morning of 7December.The final Japanese instructions, telling the Japanese ambassador to submit the reply to the US government at 1p mW ashington time on 7D ecember,w as intercepted at 4:30 am Washington time at Bainbridge. It was followed by the last message of the series -amessage ordering the Japanese embassy to destroy its code machines and secret documents after deciphering the incoming messages.
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Although most of the intelligence and warning available prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor was general and strategic, there were also anumber of more specific, tactical warnings of the potential for hostile action against Hawaii. One of the most intriguing of these reports is at elegram sent by Joseph Grew,t he American ambassador in Tokyo, on 27 January 1941. He reported that the Peruvian Minister to Japan had heard ar eport that seemed 'fantastic', that should trouble break out between Japan and the United States, the Japanese intended to make as urprise attack on Pearl Harbor 'using all of their military equipment'. 33 Grew himself discounted the report at the time, and the consensus of historians who have studied it is that while it turned out to be prescient, it had no basis in fact. The source of the rumor has never been confirmed. 34 If the rumor was just someone's lucky guess, it was an extraordinarily timely one, as the rumor originated at nearly the same time that the lead Japanese planner,A dmiral Yamamoto, was completing his original plan for the Pearl Harbor attack. 35 Richard Betts has described it as 'a curious example of a"perfect" warning that was really unjustified'.
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Another tactical intelligence warning indicated that Japan was very interested in Pearl Harbor.O n1 4S eptember 1941, the Japanese Foreign Ministry sent am essage to its Honolulu consulate asking for detailed reporting on the ships at Pearl Harbor.T he message was translated by US Army intelligence on 9O ctober,a nd delivered to the Office of Naval Intelligence with amark indicating it was of interest. 37 Alater message, on 15 November,d irected that these reports were to be made twice aw eek, and were to divide the waters of Pearl Harbor into five sub-areas and report on warships and carriers at anchor. 38 Washington intelligence agencies did not inform the military commanders in Hawaii about this 15 November message, and after the Pearl Harbor attack it became known as the 'bomb plot' message. It was cited by the Congressional investigations into Pearl Harbor as an important missed warning. 39 Finally,t he US Army operated an Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) on Oahu, with mobile, truck-mounted radars set up at various points around the island. One position was on the northern tip of Oahu, at Kahuku Point, 33 Pearl Harbor Hearings,v ol.14, p.1042. 34 Possible sources for the rumor have been reported to include aJapanese cook at the Peruvian embassy who had been reading anovel about an attack on Pearl Harbor,adrunken Japanese diplomat at ap arty,a nd the Peruvian minister'sJapanese translator-secretary. 35 Prange offers the most complete discussion of this incident, but even his research could not determine the source with any confidence. Prange, Goldstein and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, pp.31-5. 36 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings 1982) p.45. 37 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor,p p.211 -3;P range, Goldstein and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, p.249. 38 The text of this message is in Pearl Harbor Hearings,v ol.12, p.261. 39 Layton writes that if they had seen this information in Hawaii they would have taken increased defensive precautions. He calls the failure to notify Hawaii 'blind stupidity at the least, and gross neglect at best'. Edwin T. Layton which was also called Opana. On 7December the radars were to be manned from 4:00 am to 7:00 am, but the operators at Opana decided to remain on duty past 7:00 am At 7:02 am they began seeing something unusual on their screen: agroup of aircraft that first appeared 137 miles north of Oahu. They called the AW Sinformation center at Fort Shafter,Hawaii, and after several minutes spent trying to reach anyone in charge, they were able to speak to Lt. Kermit Tyler,anArmy Air Corps officer in training who had the 4:00 am to 8:00 am shift. He thought the aircraft were probably aflight of American B-17 bombers due back from the mainland that morning, and told the two privates to forget about it. Most senior staff and operations officers in Hawaii appear to have shared this confidence, and were dismissive toward anyone who expressed greater concern. This view was captured in an incident described by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer,Lieutenant Commander Edwin Layton. On Saturday 29 November,aweek before the Pearl Harbor attack, Layton arrived late at the wardroom mess for lunch. When someone asked his opinion of the situation, he repliedthathethought he wouldbebackinhis officethe next day, Sundayclearly suggesting that he expected acrisis was about to occur.That Sunday passed peacefully,a nd on the following Monday he was greeted with jeers and cries of: 'What happened to your crisis, Layton? Layton and his Sunday crisis'. 42 This incident suggests that Kimmel and his senior advisors were so confident in disregarding thep ossibility of surprise attack that,i n Wohlstetter'sw ords, 'the only signal that could and did spell "hostile action" to them was the bombing itself'. 43 Even the senior navy intelligence officers in Hawaii -s uch as Layton, who as we have seen was criticized for worrying too much -d id not actually 40 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor,pp.6-12(quoting Tyler on p.12); Prange, Goldstein and Dillon, At Dawn We Slept,p p.499 -501. 41 believe the Japanese Navy was capable of launching an attack against Pearl Harbor.This disbelief was most poignantly expressed in afamous exchange between Kimmel and Layton. On 1December Kimmel told Layton to prepare ar eport setting out the locations of the Japanese fleet units. This was a difficult task, Layton later stated, because the Japanese Navy had just changed its call signs, and especially because for the previous several days there had been no radio transmissionsnoted coming to or from the Japanese carriers. Most analysts believed the carriers were probably in home waters, but with nothing specific to report, Layton wrote down for the carriers 'Unknown-home waters? ' Layton took the report to Kimmel on 2D ecember,a nd he later described Kimmel'sreaction: 
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It was against this background -t he expectation of war in the Pacific, but no belief in athreat to Hawaii -t hat the navy and army sent out aseries of warning dispatches on 24, 27 and 28 November.The middle dispatch of this series was sent by the navy and began with the famous phrase: 'This dispatch is to be considered aw ar warning'.
48
In these messages the service chiefs warned of ap ossible Japanese 'surprise aggressive movement in any direction'. But despite their ominous wording, the messages were actually quite ambiguous, and did not suggest the possibility of attack against Pearl Harbor.
What about receptivity at the highest levels in Washington? What did Franklin Roosevelt and his key advisors know,a nd what did they believe was possible, in the months before the Pearl Harbor attack? Although Roosevelt never made his innermost thoughts and intentions clear even to his closest aides, the available evidence suggests that while he and his inner circle felt war with Japan was likely,t hey did not consider an attack on Pearl Harbor to be arealistic threat. 49 Roosevelt and his advisors appear to have drawn their clues from the same communications intercepts and other intelligence sources that the Washington military leadership was seeing, which indicated that the only question was, in which direction would Japan make its first move when the war began -t ot he north, toward Russia, or south, toward Indochina?
With the ample assistance of hindsight, we can see that two factors combined to make senior officials unreceptive toward warning of apossible attack on Pearl Harbor.T he first factor was that few officials -e ven intelligence officials responsible for warning -f elt there was areal threat of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. None of the many warnings they received was enough to convince them to take the threat seriously.B ut there was also a second factor at work: ag eneral lack of trust in intelligence on the part of many senior leaders. Frederick Parker,f or example, has written that intelligence derived from cryptography and traffic analysis, which was particularly important in determining Japanese intentions, was not trusted by military commanders: 47 Pearl Harbor Hearings,v ol.14, p.1044. 48 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor,p .45. 49 Ambassador Grew'sr eport in particular was discounted and does not appear to have influenced Roosevelt. John K. Emmerson, aForeign Service officer in Tokyo, later wrote that an attack on Hawaii was considered out of the bounds of possibility.AJ apanese move into Southeast Asia was considered possible at the time, according to Emmerson: 'In our minds, however,adirect assault on American territory was insane and therefore unthinkable'; John K. Emmerson, 'Principles Versus Realities: U.S. Prewar Foreign Policy Toward Japan' in Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (eds.) Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1990) p.40.
The lack of confidence in such intelligence made traffic intelligence from the Pacific during the last half of 1941 more an elaborate rumor than trustworthy source material. Commandersa tt he theater level and in Washington, through lack of early training or insight, were not prepared to exploit the intelligence provided by this source, particularly when the messages themselves could not be read.
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Midway: AC ase of Receptive Decision-Making
Historians and scholars of intelligence are nearly unanimous in describing the Battle of Midway as ag reat success for American intelligence. James Wirtz, for example, describes Midway as one of the rare cases in which decision-makers are able to get what he calls 'the Holy Grail of intelligence: accurate and timely indications of exactly when, where, how, and why an opponent will strike'.
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The conventional understanding is that American intelligence organizations, inspired by their failure to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor,w ere able to break the Japanese codes and predict exactly when and where the next major attack would come. Admiral Chester Nimitz then used this information to expertly position his fleet to meet the Japanese attack, and while ultimate victory required a combination of luck and valor on the American side, the victory could not have been obtained had it not been for the initial advantage assured by intelligence.
52
Because the story of intelligence success is so well known, we might expect there to be little mystery about why and how decision-makers were receptive toward intelligence before the battle. Midway should be as trong case for Marrin's' standard model' of the intersection between policymakers and intelligence, as military commanders would be expected to pay more attention to warnings of Japanese actions in early 1942 then they had before the attack on Pearl Harbor.B ut this section argues that the story of intelligence success at Midway is more complicatedt han it is traditionally portrayed. Even in the months following Pearl Harbor,i tw as very difficult for intelligence officials to get decision-makers to pay attention to specific warnings about potential Japanese attacks -i ncluding warnings that accurately predicted the attack against Midway. 
Warnings before Midway
Although the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had answered many questions for American strategic planners -s uch as when the war they were expecting would come -i ttold them little about where and when they should prepare to meet the next Japanese assault. In the immediate weeks and months after the attack the Japanese effort was devoted to expanding their area of control in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. But where, American officials needed to know,would the Japanese turn next?
Thet raditional sourceso fs trategic-level intelligence on Japan, such as diplomatic communications,w ereo flittleh elpina nswering questionsa bout thecountry's future military plans. Butthatdid notmeanthere wasalack of predictionsa nd estimatesf or what theJ apanesew ould do.D uringt he early months of 1942,navyintelligenceofficialsinW ashingtonattimes predicteda Japanese assaultonthe Aleutians.Admiral King,the Commander in Chiefofthe US Fleet, sometimessuspected Hawaii mightbethe target forarepeat attack, butatother timeshebelievedthe Japanese wouldcontinuetofocus on theSouth Pacific.Meanwhile,the US Army AirForce worriedabout thechanceofanair raid on SanF rancisco,w hile Secretaryo fW ar Stimsonw as more concerned aboutanattackonthe Panama CanalthananewattackonHawaii. 53 In the immediate days and weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor,morale was low among the intelligence staff in Hawaii. The naval intelligence unit, known as Hypo, lapsed into what Frederick Parker has called 'an eclipse that lasted until late January 1942'. 54 Hypo personnel felt they had failed, and for atime they were hesitant to offer analysis and assessmentsintheir intelligence reporting, sticking instead to the bare facts. Decision-makers also had lost confidence in intelligence. As Levite has noted, the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor had an egative effect on receptivity: 'The immediate impact of the Pearl Harbor debacle was to shatter confidence in intelligence and discredit intelligence organizationsa nd products. Under these circumstances, the receptivity of policymakers at all levels to intelligence warning was lower than before'. 55 According to National Security Agency (NSA) historian Henry Schorreck, senior officials were especially doubtful about communications intelligence, both because it was new,a nd because it had failed to warn of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 56 After the attack on Pearl Harbor it might be expected that American decision-makers would be primed to respond to further warnings of Japanese attacks. But even so, good intelligence was not always listened to. An example of how unreceptive the military leadership in Hawaii was toward the warnings from intelligence was an operation that Japan called Operation K, and which has since been described as the 'second attack on Pearl Harbor'. On the night of 3-4 March 1942, two Japanese long-range flying boats made an ight-time armed reconnaissance flight over Oahu. The pilots apparently intended to drop four bombs on Pearl Harbor -f or what Prange has described as 'strictly for terrorist purposes', and which the standard Japanese account says was for 'psychological effect' -b ut because of overcast conditions they mistakenly dropped them into the Punch Bowl crater near Honolulu, causing public commotion but no injuries.
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The senior navy cryptologic officer in Hawaii, Joe Rochefort, had warned that the Japanese might attempt aseaplane reconnaissance, but his warnings had not been taken seriously by the military leaders on the island. Rochefort was bitter about the episode later,s aying: 'the next morning Com 14 [the navy'sregional commander] sent for me and was quite irritated because these people had appeared and had flown more or less unmolested over the island of Oahu. It was actually incredible'.
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In early April, intelligence began to indicate that the Japanese were planning ap usht owardP ortM oresby, an Australianb aseo nt he southeastern coast of New Guinea. Pete Azzole has written a series of articles based on Rochefort'so ral history for Cryptolog,ajournal of the US Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, and these articles are available online at , http://www. usncva.org/clog/index.html . .S ee also Layton, Pineau and Costello, 'And IW as There', p.373. Of note, al ater Japanese reconnaissance flight over Midway on the night of 9-10 March was shot down, which could indicate greater willingness to listen to intelligence warnings, better defensive precautions, or both; see Horn, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor, pp.117 -28. 59 enough intelligence to commit his forces to defend in that area, and on that date he dispatched the carriers Lexington and Yorktown to the Coral Sea under Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to meet the Japanese fleet. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea from 4-8 May was tactically adraw,but strategically it was the first setback for the Japanese in the war,a nd it was as ignificant triumph for US communications intelligence. As NSA historian Schorreck later wrote: 'Comint [communicationsintelligence] passed its first test under fire and proved it could provide accurate, timely intelligence'. 60 Ronald Lewin has written that after the failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor,t he intelligence officials in Hawaii 'urgently needed ... am anifest and credible success'. 61 The Battle of the Coral Sea turned out to be just such as uccess. It was an important victory for intelligence, according to Layton, especially 'because it persuaded Nimitz to trust Rochefort over and above the often conflicting assessments being made by naval intelligence in Washington'. 62 
Nimitz and Intelligence Receptivity
Admiral Nimitz was as trong supporter of intelligence from the moment he arrived in Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor to relieve Admiral Kimmel as the commander of US forces in the Pacific (CinCPac). An indicator of that support was the fact that he kept Edwin Layton on as his intelligence officereven though Layton had been Kimmel'ssenior intelligence officer.Layton, in fact, was the only officer besides Nimitz himself who remained attached to CinCPac headquarters throughout the war. 63 Layton has written that once Nimitz took command, he encouraged Layton to come to his office at any time with new information. 'Apart from his flag secretary,Iwas the only one accorded this privilege. Nimitz clearly appreciated and understood that good intelligence is essential to sound strategic decisions'. 64 skeptical of its value. If radio intelligence was all that efficient, how had the attack of December 7, 1941, been possible?' 65 When the admiral took his first tour of the Hypo facility soon after arriving, he asked only af ew questions and left, giving the impression that he had not been impressed. 66 Nimitz was not easily convinced to trust the intelligence he received from Layton and Rochefort that indicated the Japanese were planning to attack Midway.Even the successful use of intelligence at the Battle of the Coral Sea was not enough to convince Nimitz to put too much stock in the intelligence he was receiving. As the intelligence reporting on the Japanese plans became more specific as the battle drew nearer,Nimitz was only partially convinced that Midway was going to be the next target. Nimitz 'had not rushed to buy the whole package as Layton and Rochefort saw it', thinking it could be a trap set by the Japanese, Prange writes. 67 On approximately 8M ay 1942, Layton went to Nimitz to warn him about the growing evidence pointing toward Midway as the target. As Layton later related the story,h et old the admiral it was important enough that he needed to see the various pieces of intelligence at first hand: he needed to come down to the Combat Intelligence Unit for ap ersonal, indepth briefing. Nimitz said he was too busy,and would believe what Layton was telling him. Layton countered: 'It isn'tt hat. Iw ant you to see it and be as convinced as Ia m'. 68 Nimitz agreed to send Captain Lynde D. McCormick, his war plans officer, to review the raw data. McCormick also told Layton that he was too busy to come to the intelligence unit, but he finally agreed to set aside two hours. When McCormick arrived in the Hypo offices, Rochefort had spread his intercepts of Japanese communications out on am akeshift table of planks and sawhorses. He carefully showed McCormick how the different pieces of intelligence fitted together.A ccording to Walter Lord: 'McCormick was fascinated. In the end, he spent not two but three and ah alf hours poking around, flipping the material, asking athousand tough, show-me questions'. Ultimately: 'McCormick came away completely convinced, and to sell McCormick was to sell Nimitz. From that day on, the Admiral was the staunchest ally Rochefort and Layton could hope to have'. 69 Navy'sW ar Plans department also had its doubts. 70 In order to convince the doubters -e specially those in Washington -i ntelligence officials in Hawaii came up with ap lan for what was to become one of the most famous incidents in American intelligence history.
In order to confirm that 'AF' really did refer to Midway,amessage was sent to the US garrison on the island via an undersea cable (which could not be intercepted by Japan). The message directed Midway to report in an uncoded radio transmission that they were having trouble with their desalination plant, and were running short on water.Sure enough, within afew days after Midway sent such ar eport, aJ apanese message was intercepted and decrypted that reported that 'AF' was running low on water. 71 Although the' AF ruse' has become an important part of American intelligence lore,the twoprincipal actors in thedrama have both downplayedits importance. BothL ayton and Rocheforth avea rguedt hatt he ruse wasn ot intendedtoconfirm that theJapanese were planning to attack Midway,because they hadalreadybecomeconvinced of that fact. Norwas it to persuadeNimitz of thethreat, becausehe, too, hadbecome abeliever by then.Instead, thereason forthe ruse wastoprove thedoubters in Washington wrong -totry to overcome their lack of receptivity -a nd even then,itdid not convince everyone. 72 By themiddleofMay,Nimitzwas becoming more and more convincedofthe threat to Midway.B ut many dissentingv oices continuedt ob er aised, both in Washington and in Hawaii.L tG en.D elos C. Emmons,t he Commanding Generalofthe US Army's Hawaiian Department, wasconcerned forthe threat to Hawaii,ratherthan Midway.Heforwarded to Nimitz aletter prepared by army intelligence that argueditwas more prudent to plan on thebasis of everything thee nemy wasc apableo fd oing -a nd aftera ll,t he army warned,J apanh ad proven itselfcapableofattacking Hawaii. 73 In addition, Op-20-GinWashington continuedt od isagree with thea ssessmentsf romL ayton and Rochefort, arguingthat theinvasionmight be aimedatJohnstonIsland instead. 74 In response to these complaints, Nimitz assigned another member of his staff, Captain James Steele, the task of reassessing the intelligence and playing the role of devil'sadvocate, challenging the data and making Rochefort and Layton back up every point of their argument. According to Lord: 'Steele really threw himself into the job. Layton rued the day it ever happened, but from Nimitz'spoint of view the assignment served two very useful purposes'. First, it was aresponse to Emmons' letter,and second, it was acheck just in case they were all wrong.
The end result of all these developments -t he intelligence success at Coral Sea, the careful investigations by McCormick and Steele, and the close relationship that Nimitz had with his intelligence officers -w as that Nimitz had become ab eliever both in the value of intelligence and in the warnings that Midway was the target of the next Japanese offensive. But even then, he was careful not to express too much confidence in the intelligence picture. On 16 May Nimitz'sC ommand Summary assessed that the Japanese would attack Midway and raid Oahu in the first part of June, adding cautiously that, 'unless the enemy is using radio deception on agrand scale, we have afairly good idea of his intentions'. On 14 May Admiral King, not yet convinced that the target was Midway, directed Nimitz to declare astate of 'Fleet Opposed Invasion'. He cited four possible enemy actions that needed to be planned for: an attack on Midway-Oahu, on the Aleutians, on Nauru, or to the southeast of New Guinea.
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Within af ew days, however,K ing had come around to Hawaii's assessment that the Japanese were planning to attack Midway and the Aleutians, and he sent amessage to Nimitz saying he agreed.
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But still OP-20-G and the US Navy WarP lans staff under Rear Admiral Turner saw it differently,a nd a1 5M ay message, apparently from Turner,a rgued that an offensive was pending against northeast Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji, starting in mid-June. thegeneral pictureofsuccessfuluse of intelligence by theAmericans at Midway thereisone glaringexception that demonstrates that even very good intelligence canbedismissed andfailure result,ifthe decision-maker is notreceptive.
Because the intercepted Japanese plans indicated the Midway assault would include afeint toward Alaska, Nimitz in late May sent Rear Admiral Robert Theobald to the Aleutians in command of asmall task force of ships. Theobald was told -b ut without being given details about where the information came from -t hat intelligence indicated the Japanese intended to invade Attu and Kiska, at the far western end of the Aleutian chain. He was also told that the Japanese were considering mounting an air strike, strictly as adiversion, against the more significant American air field at Dutch Harbor, farther to the east and closer to the mainland. Theobald was skeptical: what possible reason could the Japanese have for invading such distant and desolate spots as Attu and Kiska? He concluded the intelligence reports were likely the result of Japanese deception, and Japan instead intended to attack in strength against Dutch Harbor,t he more significant target. He then deployed his forces far to the east -w here they were of little use in countering the main brunt of the Japanese attack, when it came as predicted against the outer Aleutians well to the west. 82 
Explaining the Difference between Pearl Harbor and Midway
Before Pearl Harbor was attacked, neither key decision-makers nor senior intelligence officials truly believed that the Japanese Navy was capable of mounting an attack on Hawaii. The intelligence that was most useful in giving indications of Japanese intentions was primarily derived from the new, still relatively little understood field of codebreaking, and few senior leaders had yet learned to trust it. In addition, the warnings that were obtained from this intelligence were generally strategic, long-range in nature, and could be interpreted as proving little more than that Japan was preparing for aw ar that everyone knew was coming.
In contrast to the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor,the American victory at the Battle of Midway was to ag reat extent the result of outstanding intelligence. But the successful use of intelligence preceding Midway was more complex and difficult than conventional accounts suggest. The failure at Pearl Harbor,f ar from encouraging military commanders to pay more attention to intelligence, had the effect of making them more likely to dismiss the assessments of their intelligence staffs. Even Admiral Nimitz, who was inclined to listen to his intelligence officer,n eeded to be carefully and repeatedly convinced -e specially when the intelligence came from the obscure world of codebreaking, and he was receiving assessments from Washington that conflicted with those of his own staff in Hawaii. Only when early successes at the Battle of the Coral Sea showed what intelligence could do did Nimitz and others begin to put their trust in the work of the cryptologists. And only when Rochefort and Layton were willing and able to give Nimitz the precise predictions of Japanese actions he needed, did he commit US forces to meet the coming threat.
Layton demonstrated this lingering uncertainty -t his continuing lack of receptivity toward intelligence -i nc ommenting on the relief both he and Nimitz felt when the Japanese fleet was finally sighted on the morning of the battle, almost exactly where he had predicted they would be:
So we were very glad indeed to see them at the point where they were sighted. There had been those who did not profess to believe Midway to be the objective; some even thought the Japanese 'AF' operation to be a huge deception for an attack on Oahu or the West Coast of the U.S. He The comparison between the receptivity of intelligence in the two cases of Pearl Harbor and Midway demonstrates that the key factors are ab elief in the threat, and trust in intelligence. In addition, this comparison shows how the more precise and tactical the intelligence is, the more likely it is to be believed and acted upon. In the months before Pearl Harbor,there was agreat deal of long-range, strategic intelligence on the Japanese threat, but little specific, credible information on ap lanned attack on Hawaii. Even if such intelligence had been developed, it is not clear that the military commanders on the scene or in Washington would have acted on it, because they were united in their belief that such an attack was impossible.
After Pearl Harbor the strategic threat from Japan was of course clear.But strategic warning was not enough to defend against another surprise Japanese attack, this time against Midway.A merican commanders had only limited naval assets, and needed tactical-level intelligence to know where best to station their forces. American intelligence officers -p rimarily in Hawaiiwere able to obtain that intelligence by breaking the Japanese codes and learning the specific details of the Japanese assault plan. But even after that code was broken, American commanders had to be convinced that the intelligence could be trusted, and that the US fleet should be stationed in position to meet an attack on Midway,a tt he possible expense of leaving undefended Hawaii, areas of the Southwest Pacific, or even the American West Coast. Admiral Nimitz ultimately was convinced, but only after intelligence proved its worth at the Battle of Coral Sea.
Conclusion and Implications
As Arthur Hulnick has noted, 'even the best intelligence is not worth much if policy makers refuse to take action '. 84 This article helps advance our 83 Layton, Oral History of Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton,p .48. 84 understanding of why,atleast in some cases, they refuse to take that action. The comparison of how intelligence was received in the failure of Pearl Harbor and the success of Midway suggests that neither the standard model of intelligence-policy relations, nor the alternative model that privileges the role of decision-makerp redetermined beliefs, can satisfactorily explain why and when leaders listen to the intelligence they receive. When leaders do not really believe in athreat, or when they do not understand intelligence enough to trust it, they are rarely likely to listen to even the best and most vivid warnings.
These findings suggest several avenues for further research. For example, the two factors -b elief in the threat, and trust in intelligence -d on ot necessarily accompany each other.Leaders may believe strongly in acertain threat or issue, and yet distrust the informationt hey receive from the intelligence community; af requently cited example is President George W. Bush in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, they may have ag ood relationship with their intelligence advisors, and yet not believe in acertain type of threat that intelligence is advocating. An example here might be President George H.W.Bush, who despite his long experience with intelligence was unreceptive toward warnings of Iraqi aggression before the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. How often and why do these factors align?
Another area for further research is the question of how important proximity is in determining intelligence receptiveness. Marrin has also examined the role that proximity plays, and found that it is not as powerful an explanation as some have speculated. 85 The two cases studied here suggest that geographical proximity may in fact play an important role: before Midway,the intelligence personnel and military commanders in Hawaii were considerably more receptive to the possibility of aJ apanese attack on Midway than were their counterparts in Washington. Asimilar case might be that of Vietnam in the period before the TetO ffensive in 1968; Alexander Ovodenko has recently described the US analysts and commanders in Vietnam as being considerably more receptive toward warnings of an impending enemy offensive than were their counterparts in Washington. 86 Finally,this article suggests there may be value in examining the role that strategic-level intelligence and warning can play in influencing receptivity,as opposed to intelligence that is more tactical and more specific. Policymakers often say they want long-term, strategic-level intelligence, and yet the two cases examined here suggest that what they may really need is tactical warning of specific events. Strategic warning may not be enough to prevent surprise attacks, and intelligence and national security communities may in fact face what could be called the paradox of strategic warning.
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Strategiclevel intelligence and warning is highly sought after by decision-makers, and as we have seen in the case of Pearl Harbor,itisoften relatively plentiful. But strategic intelligence is in fact unlikely to be accepted by decision-makers, and is rarely useful in preventing attacks. Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, is much harder to acquire, but when available -s uch as it was before Midway -i ti smuch more likely to be useful and actionable.
This last finding indicates that much of the problem with recent cases of unreceptive policymakers -s uch as before the Christmas Day bombing attempt -m ay be that the warnings were simply too strategic, too broad, for policymakers to act upon, and for that reason they were unreceptive. Similarly,w arnings about the potential for unrest in Egypt may have resembled warnings before Pearl Harbor: they may have sounded reasonable, and ultimately they may have been proved correct, but they were of little use because in the absence of specific, credible warning, policymakers were not ready to listen.
